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In April 2008 Richard J. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr. presented a statement to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee called ‘Implementing Smart Power: Setting an 
Agenda for National Security Reform’. Armitage and Nye see smart power as ‘an 
integrated grand strategy that combines hard military power with soft ‘attractive 
power”’ (2008, p. 3). Whereas ‘hard and soft’ powers are descriptors, ‘smart’ power 
embodies evaluation. Smart power is a non-coercive strategy that aims to attract 
‘others’1 to a set of goals and values or a desired agenda. As there is a great variation 
amongst ‘others’, smart power must be reflexive and intelligent in the face of 
differing contexts and cultures.  
Suzanne Nossel first mooted smart power in Foreign Affairs in 2004. She equated 
smart power to liberal internationalism and advocated a post 9/11 foreign policy 
‘focusing on the smart use of power to promote U.S. interests through a stable grid of 
allies, institutions, and norms’ (2004, pp. 131-142). Armitage and Nye developed 
smart power ‘in large part as a reaction to the global war on terror, a concept that we 
consider wrongheaded as an organizing premise of US foreign policy’ (2008, p. 4). 
Nossel expressed similar sentiments, saying that whilst the Bush regime ‘adopted the 
trappings of liberal internationalism, entangling the rhetoric of human rights and 
democracy in a strategy of aggressive unilateralism [….] the militant imperiousness 
of the Bush administration is fundamentally inconsistent with the ideals they claim to 
invoke’ (2004, pp. 131-142). In other words the United States (US) has not been very 
smart in terms of its counter-terrorism policy. Nevertheless smart power was invoked, 
and indeed embraced in policy circles, as a strategy capable of directing future US 
foreign policy in a fashion that married the seductive message of soft power with the 
authority and resolve of hard power. International actors would align themselves with 
the aims and values of the US and they would do this more or less willingly.   
Smart power did not crystalize as a policy until the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) launched a bipartisan Commission on Smart Power in 
2006. The CSIS published a report in 2007, ‘A Smarter More Secure America’ 
(Armitage and Nye, 2007). The report took stock of America’s role in the world and 
sought to devise ‘smarter’ ways of wielding American power. Various think tanks 
continue to thrash out ways to operationalize smart power. In a later report entitled 
‘Putting “Smart Power” to Work An Action Agenda for the Obama Administration 
and the 11th Congress’ the authors argue that ‘Despite […] tactical differences, the 
path ahead is clear’ (Signer, 2008). In fact the path ahead is far from clear. Smart 
power exists as an aspiration and sound bite. However in practice it risks being no 
more than an unsophisticated decanting of the old wines of hard and soft power into 
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new smart power bottles. Smart needs to be sophisticated and credible not least 
because new technology and social media easily expose untruths and strategic failure.  
The US has struggled to develop meaningful smart power strategies as it has limited 
‘contextual intelligence’. The US has thrown its own constitutional rulebook away in 
relation to the Global War on Terror. It has broken national and international laws in 
relation to e.g. privacy and surveillance and torture whilst at the same time using the 
moralistic rhetoric of just war to justify its foreign policy interventions. The US is 
also weak in terms of ‘self-knowledge’. Smart power must be mindful of the local 
environment, structural influences and also the lessons of the past. Contextual 
intelligence is of key importance to counter-terrorism strategies. 
This article starts by assessing the theoretical development of smart power. The article 
then addresses the problem of measuring power and influence. Smart power is an 
amalgamation of variables and it is important to understand the interplay between 
these variables as they relate to compliance. This article then focuses on US counter-
terror initiatives since 2001 to show why the need for smart power strategies arose 
and to test their efficacy. One of the peculiarities of smart power is that the military is 
seen as a source of soft as well as of hard power. Armitage and Nye argue that this is 
because ‘the US military is the best-trained and resourced arm of the federal 
government. As a result it has had to step in to fill voids, even with work better suited 
to civilian agencies’ (2008, p. 4). Consequently the concept and agenda of smart 
power is influencing the evolution of counter-insurgency doctrine. Economic aid and 
military aid are disbursed under the auspices of USAID and the military is now tasked 
with soft and hard power strategies that have proven problematic to manage as ‘an 
integrated grand strategy’. This serves as an empirical testing ground on what has 
worked, to what extent and within which specific contexts. 
This article also investigates US foreign aid as an instrument of ‘soft’ power. 
Economic power is traditionally mooted as hard power. I argue that foreign aid is 
designed to co-opt as opposed to other kinds of economic incentives that are designed 
to induce or compel. However co-option also needs to endure or ‘stick’. According to 
Walter Russell Mead sticky power ‘comprises a set of economic institutions and 
policies that attracts others towards US influence and then traps them in it’ (2009). 
Foreign aid is arguably such a trap. It is a means to enmesh the interests of recipients 
with those of the US. This is done through a web of attraction and conditionality. 
Sticky power ‘seduces as much as it compels’ (Mead, 2004, p.25). As an instrument 
of sticky power, foreign aid lies somewhere between hard material power and soft 
attractive power. ‘Sticky’ power has not become embedded in US political lexicon in 
the way that smart power has. Perhaps because it invokes the idea of a US controlled 
quagmire.             
The effectiveness of smart power, as a mutually enforcing combination of hard, sticky 
and soft power, will be measured against notions of public trust in recipient countries. 
Public trust is an important indicator as terrorists operate in, and are sustained by, 
social as well as political contexts. It is acknowledged that the cases referenced in this 
article offer only a partial and context specific picture. Nevertheless a tentative 
correlation can be drawn between high levels of US aid and low levels of trust in the 
US in frontline Islamic states.  In conclusion it will be argued that smart power is 
predominantly an aspiration as opposed to a strategy. This has led to slippage between 
hard and soft power and un-smart or non-stick policy. Consequently a gap has 
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emerged between what the US hopes that the international community will respond to 
in terms of smart power as a counter-terror initiative and what actually happens. This 
phenomenon is particularly apparent in Islamic states at the frontline of the war on 
terror. The US has tended to revert to hard power tools in the face of this gap. This 
strategy serves to undermine rather than reinforce smart power initiatives. This article 
seeks to highlight mistakes that have been made and suggests a more ‘contextually 
intelligent’ approach to smart power.    
A Brief History of Smart Power    
 
Smart Power is nothing new. In her 2010 Foreign Policy article entitled ‘Brainier 
Brawn: “Smart Power”, a brief history’ Elizabeth Dickinson starts her chronology 
with the morality and militarism that underpinned the thinking of Carl Von Clauswitz 
in 1832. Smart power is a nice idea in theory however ‘neither the advocates of soft 
power nor the proponents of hard power have adequately integrated their positions 
into a single framework to advance the national interest’ (Armitage and Nye, 2008, p. 
110).  
Nye’s work on power finds its roots in his 1990 work Bound to Lead: The Changing 
Nature of American Power. At this stage Nye’s work was a reflection on the position 
that the US held in the world, the resources at its disposal and how it might choose to 
convert these to influence. Nye’s later 2004 work Soft Power: The Means to Success 
in World Politics continued his theorizing on the conversion of resources into power 
with the development of the notion of soft power. At the time of writing the 
international popularity of the US was in the doldrums. Nye saw this as a 
consequence of the Iraq war. He argued that the decline of US popularity matters as 
the war on terror cannot be won alone and therefore allies are essential. He notes that 
self-interest will drive allies into the arms of the US. However the more ‘attractive’ 
the US is to allies ‘the less need there will be for concessions and the easier it will be 
to obtain desired outcomes’ (Nye, 2004a, p. 129). Nye’s thinking reflects a deliberate 
strategy on the part of the Bush regime to articulate terrorism as a universal threat as 
opposed to a threat to the US only. This strategy was designed to convince the global 
audience that the US is working for the greater good as opposed to merely its own 
national interest.  
Empirical work on US driven smart power is a relative rarity in International 
Relations journals. The articles that are in evidence tend to appear in Foreign Affairs 
and Foreign Policy and wrestle with smart power as an abstract concept. These 
articles are mostly written by or are heavily referenced to Nye. However there are 
some notable exceptions; i.e. in Ernest J. Wilson’s article ‘Hard, Power, Soft Power, 
Smart Power’ in Annals of the American Academy of Political Science (2008). Wilson 
argues that the US approach to smart power appears inert compared to sophisticated 
challengers such as India and China. The most salient aspects of Wilson’s work are 
his comments on the ‘target’ of soft power, ‘self-knowledge’ on the part of those 
seeking to wield smart power, the broader structural environment in which smart 
power is to be exercised and the attention to what types of tools to use and when 
(2008, p. 115). These factors relate to what Nye calls ‘contextual intelligence’ (2008, 
pp. 85-108). The main focus of Wilson’s critique is the institutional complexity and 
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competitiveness within the US that serves to undermine the consolidated development 
of smart power as a national security strategy.  
Also in 2008 in The Powers to Lead Nye continued his theorizing on the conversion 
of resources to influence by examining ‘contextual intelligence’. He argued that 
‘contextual intelligence is an intuitive diagnostic skill that helps a leader align tactics 
with objectives to create smart strategies in varying situations’ (2008, p. 88). This 
relates directly to Wilson’s reference to ‘targets’ (2008, p. 115). According to Wilson 
a target must be understood in terms of ‘its internal nature and its broader global 
context. Power cannot be smart if those who wield it are ignorant of these attributes of 
the target populations and regions’ (2008, p. 115).  
More recently Giulio M. Gallarotti’s 2015 article ‘Smart Power: Definitions, 
Importance, and Effectiveness’ in the Journal of Strategic Studies argues that ‘soft’ 
and ‘smart’ power, as theoretical concepts, are in their infancy and ‘their historical 
applications have been limited and far from rigorously executed’ (2015, p. 246). 
Gallarotti posits that soft and smart power will become increasingly important for 
international relations given the prohibitive costs and consequences of both nuclear 
and conventional weaponry and the checks and balances that democratic 
accountability and global socio-economic interdependence bring. Gallorotti’s 
empirical assessment focuses on the US goals of limiting terrorism, promoting 
democracy abroad and reducing the threat of WMD. He argues that the neo-
conservative driven, unilateral, hard power stance of the George W. Bush 
administration was self-defeating and failed on all three counts.   
 
Smart Power: problems of measurement? 
 
Components of power can include ‘influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, 
deterrence, compellence, inducement and so on’ (Baldwin, 2002, p. 177). Power is 
commonly defined as: ‘a situation in which A gets B to do something he would 
otherwise not do’ (Baldwin, 1979, p. 163). However there is more to understanding 
power than collating the components that A might have to hand in any particular 
circumstances. The fungibility of power is important, as the components of power 
may be more or less useful in differing circumstances. There is also the question of 
whether A has the inclination or intention to get B to do something it otherwise would 
not. Is A accepting of the status quo or not and if not does it have the inclination to act 
and is it willing to accept any unintended or knock on effects? The words ‘otherwise 
would not’ are also of key importance’. Influence, as it relates to power, can only be 
measured if the preferences of B are clear. Nye has noted ‘when we measure power in 
terms of the changed behavior of others, we have to know their preferences’ (1990, p. 
26).  
Nye defines soft power as the ability ‘to shape the preferences of others’ (Nye, 2004a, 
p. 5), using the power of attraction rather than threats or force. The shaping of 
preferences refers to, not just single issue-based compliance but voluntary regulatory 
and norm based compliance. Mead uses the analogy of a ‘carnivorous sundew plant, 
which attracts its prey with a kind of soft power, a pleasing scent that lures insects 
towards its sap. Once its victim has touched the sap, it is stuck and can’t get away’ 
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(2009). This illustrates how soft power attracts, and sticky maintains, the desired level 
of compliance. It is for this reason that I argue that international aid and loans can 
operate as soft, as well as, hard power. In the right context aid can co-opt rather than 
command changes in behaviour thus shifting hard bribery to soft inducement. The 
difference between the two may be a fine line. However the ultimate objective should 
not be just to produce but to also maintain the desired behavior – to make it stick. As 
already noted smart power is a strategy, the success rate of that strategy is likely to be 
greater if it is not just convincing, but sticky.           
Therefore the distinction between defensive and offensive smart/soft power is useful. 
‘Offensive soft power deals with shaping preferences whilst defensive soft power 
deals with diminishing the hard and soft power of adversaries’ (Participant Remarks, 
2009, original emphasis). The identification of pre-existing preferences offers 
particular challenges for the exercise of smart power. Has B done what A wants 
because it was already inclined to that course of action? How far did B’s attraction to 
that course grow because of the actions of A? Or did B simply decide to acquiesce to 
A’s threats? In most cases compliance is likely to be a mix of these three variables. 
However it may be more difficult to identify the extent to which offensive or 
defensive soft/smart power has been deployed as, in reality, a synergy is likely to 
exist between these two variables. The bottom line is to appeal to your target and for 
that appeal to be enduring or ‘sticky’.  
Explanations of power are subject to one’s ontological view of the world and the 
relative weight that one choses to give the components of power. Smart power can be 
described as a contextually appropriate combination of power components that can 
induce B to do what A wants without too much complaint and without too many 
adverse side effects. The problem for smart power, as a strategy, is to isolate and 
measure the relevant components, or combination of components, identify why 
specific combinations of components succeed or fail and under what conditions, and 
to apply these findings.   
Armitage and Nye argue that smart power rests on three principles: that America’s 
standing in the world matters to security and prosperity, today’s challenges can only 
be addressed with capable and willing allies and that civilian tools can enhance the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of US government policies. They argue that a ‘smarter’ 
approach to foreign policy is necessary, as contemporary challenges cannot be 
countered with military force alone. The crux of their argument is for the US to act as, 
and be seen as, a positive hegemonic force. This requires joined up thinking within 
the governmental bureaucracy of the US in terms of both international and 
transnational relations. Rhetoric and attraction are fundamental to soft power. Nye 
notes ‘success is the result not merely of whose army wins but also whose story wins’ 
(2010, p. 8).  
Post 9/11 the need to rethink the projection of US values and identity to foreign 
audiences was made clear in George W. Bush’s ‘why do they hate us?’ speech (2001). 
The US subsequently set about a number of soft power initiatives including the 
expansion of the Fulbright Educational Program and cultural initiatives such as the 
touring photography exhibition ‘After September 11: images from Ground Zero’. 
Charlotte Beers, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, also 
addressed international aid as a soft power tool. Quoting from a Qatari news article 
that stated ‘The irony is the first humanitarian aid came from the Americans. The food 
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bags have USA written on them. When I saw the Afghans running towards the 
American bags of flour, I smiled, and for the first time in my life I did not curse 
America’ she notes that ‘our goal is to take that kind of response and magnify it many 
fold so that we have our story in front of such unlikely candidates’ (2001). Note the 
word ‘story’, in other words the aid altered perceptions of a belligerent US. However 
the notion that soft power is virtuous and hard power is negative is simplistic. For 
Nye ‘it is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms’ (2006). Soft power 
can attract followers to negative or skewed as well as positive values. In its least 
sophisticated form US soft power is based upon an exceptionalist myth (Walt, 2011) 
characterized by ‘arrogance and lack of curiosity when it [comes] to other cultures 
and institutions’ (Brooks, 2013, p. 4).   
Not only is smart power difficult to measure, values are hard to instill in ‘others’ with 
differing social, cultural and religious systems. This becomes especially problematic 
when notions of e.g. freedom and the rule of law are at one and the same time 
advocated and abandoned by the US in the pursuit of the Global War on Terror. This 
is evidenced by e.g. US sanctioned torture on detainees and denying detainees the 
status of prisoner of war and habeas corpus. To be effective smart power must be 
credible, attractive and contextualized. In reality this is a constantly shifting balancing 
act. Ideally smart power should have both a pragmatic and immediate appeal to an 
audience in terms of costs and benefits (it is rational to acquiesce rather than resist) 
and an enduring and contextually appropriate appeal in terms of values. 
 
Smart Power as counter-terrorism 
 
According to David H. Ucko the US prefers to avoid counterinsurgency missions as 
they ‘tend to be protracted, demand case specific contextual intelligence and involve 
reconstruction activities, the provision of basic services and the establishment of 
governance’ (2009, p. 2). He notes that whilst these tasks are best suited to civilian 
agencies, such agencies are poorly equipped to operate in hostile situations. Therefore, 
such tasks are devolved to the military. Here we see a need for hard and soft power 
initiatives and a call for contextual intelligence. Ucko’s notion of counterinsurgency 
mirrors smart power. 
The fight against terrorism requires the synchronized deployment of hard and soft 
strategies. Soft strategies may undermine the environment in which terrorists operate. 
However, they are unlikely to divert radicals from their calling. There is a 
simultaneous need to target extremists with hard power and for soft power strategies 
that will encourage moderates to reject extremism, deny extremist groups recruits and 
encourage states that suffer from domestic insurgencies to align themselves with the 
aims and values of the US. International aid has been adopted as a vehicle of soft 
power by the US since 2001. However, for international aid to be smart as well as soft 
it also needs to be sticky.  
In a speech for the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in 
Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 President George W. Bush stated that ‘we fight poverty as 
it is an answer to terror [and] Developed nations have a duty not only to share our 
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wealth, but also to encourage sources that produce wealth: economic freedom, 
political liberty, the rule of law and human rights’. He then announced the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and a 50% increase in core development 
assistance over the next three budget years. Bush was suggesting that developed 
countries should seek to foster US type values of freedom and liberty in impoverished 
countries with populations susceptible to the siren call of radical terrorism. The MCA 
was premised on a link between poverty and terrorism and development assistance 
was designed to encourage recipient nations to adopt US values. The MCA was in 
addition to the $297 million, $600 million and $250 million allocated to Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Jordan respectively, states seen as frontline in the war against terrorism, 
in the immediate aftermath of September 11th.  
The MCA marked a sea change in approach for Bush, as he was previously of the 
opinion that foreign aid was wasted on impoverished nations that were of no geo-
political significance to the US. The expansion of foreign aid was perhaps an 
indicator that hostility and resentment are better countered by soft as opposed to hard 
power. The Bush regime was waking up to the fact that US national security could not 
be achieved through force alone. Although unable to resist a military solution in 
Africa, Bush later established AFRICOM (Francis, 2010), which was designed to 
support ineffective African militaries in the face of ‘a sea of threats from international 
terrorists and widespread poverty and inequality’ (Keller, 2013).        
9/11 also heralded changes in the management of the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Since 2001 the US Department of State (DOS) increasingly 
dominated the workings of USAID and in 2006 then Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice finally merged USAID formally with the State Department. This meant that 
foreign assistance was more concretely identified with ‘a powerful foreign policy and 
national security tool, not just a humanitarian effort’ (Waxman quoted in Zwick, 
2009). However the danger of this is that aid is directed towards countries that are 
strategically important to the US in the short term as opposed to sustainably 
addressing actual need wherever it arises in the longer term. Smart power strategies, 
as they relate to counter-terrorism, have primarily directed aid towards the former.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
According to the 2012 Global Terrorism Index Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India 
register as having the highest impact of terrorism. Meanwhile USAID statistics show 
that the major recipients of US economic and military assistance were (in US 
$ billions) Afghanistan (12.9), Israel (3.0), (Iraq (2.1) and Pakistan (1.7) (USAID). 
The case of Israel can be put aside as it is an important historical ally of the US. 
However India, fourth on the list of terrorist impact, does not even make the top 25 
recipients of USAID. Traviss Cassidy has mooted that this can be explained as the US 
dispenses USAID on the basis of self-interest and whilst India has a high incidence of 
terrorism ‘it may be seen as less strategic importance in the war on terror compared to 
countries like Afghanistan or the Palestinian Territories, which house terrorists with 
the primary aim of harming the United States and Israel’ (2010, p. 69).  
George W. Bush’s approach to the Global War on Terror was akin to that of a 
messianic global policeman. The Bush regime ultimately realized the need to sell the 
‘story’ of the US. However it struggled to understand its audience in the Islamic 
world and lapsed into a ‘one-way, message-driven information assault’ (Zaharna, 
2009, p. 3). Barack Obama is less driven by such a grand vision. His public 
diplomatic initiatives have focused on rhetoric of mutual interest and hope. He has 
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called for a sustained effort to ‘listen to each other [and to] respect one another’, 
(2009).  
Obama prefers to focus on specific terrorist targets as opposed to ideology. His fight 
is crafted as being against terrorists, not Islamist terrorism, as the latter is an 
ideological strategy, not a target. Nevertheless the US administration makes or 
accepts the assumption that poverty is conducive to terrorism. Therefore targeting 
foreign aid at countries that are deemed to harbor terrorists that threaten US interests 
can be viewed as the deployment of both defensive and offensive soft power. 
Offensive in that foreign aid may encourage the recipients to align themselves with 
the values of the donor and defensive as recipients will be better placed to resist the 
threats and inducements of terrorists or those who oppose political liberty, the rule of 
law and human rights. Offensive soft power, wielded via foreign aid, relates to sticky 
power in that it can ‘trap’ recipients into aid dependency, the acceptance of neo-
liberal norms and values and the behavioural conditionality that might accompany 
such payments. The aid is also defensively sticky in that an attack on the US becomes 
an attack on the flow of aid.  
However the balance between soft and hard power is also evident in the composition 
of USAID, e.g. in Afghanistan of the total $12, 924.4 million received from USAID 
in 2011, $2,659 million is economic assistance whilst $10, 265.4 is military assistance 
(USAID). Meanwhile a 2010 Congressional Service Report is clear, ‘The U.S. 
program of assistance to Afghanistan is intended to stabilize and strengthen the 
Afghan economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular 
support for extremist forces in the region’ (Tarnoff, 2010). The volume of military 
funding would indicate that the primary vehicle for stabilization in Afghanistan is the 
military.  
No simple correlation can be identified between volumes of US aid and US popularity 
in recipient countries. US popularity is also a product of historical experience and is 
therefore context dependent. Where the US has established trustworthy relationships 
over time foreign aid may be more easily converted to trust. However for those 
countries where data is available on both volume of aid and trust in the US all 
predominantly Muslim states in the Middle East receive relatively high volumes of 
US aid and score low levels of trust in the US according to a 2013 Pew Research Poll 
(figures for Afghanistan and Iraq are not available).  
A partial explanation for this trend could be that, whilst US aid to Pakistan has 
increased significantly since 2000. Since 2004 most US drones strikes against Afghan 
insurgents have taken place in Pakistan. This activity peaked in 2010 with 849 deaths 
recorded, 16 of whom were civilians and 35 of whom could not be identified (New 
American Foundation, 2014). Drones have been mooted in the media as Obama’s 
weapon of choice. The identity of casualties is contested. However it is argued that 
only 2% (Stanford University Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and 
Global Justice Clinic, 2012) of those killed have been radical targets. Drone strikes 
also led to mass anti-US demonstrations in Pakistan. These protests, organized by the 
opposition party Tehreek-e-Insaf, included blocking main NATO supply routes into 
Afghanistan (Perera 2013). Meanwhile US aid to Pakistan as a soft power tool has 
been undermined by the US use of drones.   
Bi-lateral relations were also undermined in 2011 when US forces, under Operation 
Neptune Spear, killed Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. Bin Laden was found near the 
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Pakistani capital of Islamabad in a compound that was less than two miles from the 
prestigious Kakul Military Academy leading to speculation over exactly how much 
the Pakistani regime may have known of his whereabouts. Obama publically stated 
that the Pakistani regime was not told of the raid in advance as ‘if we had asked 
Pakistan for permission we would not have got him’. Meanwhile the Pakistani 
Abbottabad Commission’s report called the raid a ‘contemptuous disregard of 
Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in the arrogant certainty 
of […] unmatched military might’ (Hashim, 2013). Obama responded by arguing that 
the ground operation against Bin Laden was a risky exception. He also used the 
operation to argue for a continuation of the use of drones as they are effective, legal 
and, according to Obama, save lives (2013). Obama acknowledged that the cost of 
Operation Neptune Spear to the US Pakistan relationship was high. However, he also 
argues effective counter terrorism require sharp, and ideally precise tactics. At the 
same time he also argued that foreign aid ‘is fundamental to our national 
security.  And it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism’ 
(2013). Therein lies the problem. Foreign aid needs to be long term to be effective as 
‘sticky’ power whilst hard power can derail that process rapidly.  
Pew Research Centre rankings show that 10% of Americans trust Pakistan (Pew 
Research Centre, 2013). This is unfortunate, as ‘Washington cannot hope to exit 
Afghanistan until it is assured of Pakistan’s ability and willingness to stabilize itself 
and the subregion’ (Laidi, 2012, p. 100). Smart power is a strategy not an end state 
and as such it can be swiftly derailed. Obama knew that Operation Neptune would 
trigger an adverse reaction from Pakistan and he knew that drone strikes were 
unpopular. His weapons of choice were sharp and precise rather than soft and sticky. 
Thus smart power has floundered.  
The situation with Afghanistan is deemed to be even worse. A report by the 
International Crisis Group found that despite the volume of international aid flowing 
to Afghanistan: 
the international community has devoted much of its resources and 
programming to short-term counter-insurgency goals. In doing so, it has failed 
to adequately support state institutions such as parliament and the judiciary, 
that could provide a check on the power of the executive, identify citizens’ 
needs and guarantee the rule of law (2011, p. 2).   
This claim correlates with the composition of USAID flowing into Afghanistan as 
funds are predominantly for military assistance. In this case international aid conforms 
to traditional notions of economic hard power. The report notes that the militarization 
of aid has undermined humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, corruption amongst 
sub-contractors is rife and the impact of aid is difficult to measure as ‘assistance is 
shaped by stabilization goals rather than the needs, priorities and input of the 
recipients’ (2011, p. 21). The tension between short-term stabilization and nation 
building was evident in the differing strategic preferences of US military policy 
makers. In July 2010 Vice President Joe Biden went on record to say that the US was 
not in Afghanistan to nation build, it was ‘not there to turn this into a Jeffersonian 
democracy. We’re not there for ten years. We’re there to defeat al-Qaida’ (Daniel, 
2010). Thus contradicting the ‘population centric’ or ‘hearts and minds’ strategy 
advocated by serving Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petreaus.  
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The controversy over population-centric COIN in Afghanistan versus a target-
centred approach in Afghanistan reflected the internal policy debates among 
American foreign policy elites and a general dissatisfaction among the 
informed public over the apparent lack of an exit strategy (Wong-Diaz, 2013, 
53).   
Not only were hard and soft power strategies contradicting each other but policy 
makers and the public were split over these policies and there was no end of sight.  
Meanwhile African recipients of MCA funds, Kenya, Senegal and Ghana rank trust in 
the US at 81, 81 and 83% respectively. This may be because checks and balances are 
placed on MCA funding in ways that have clearly failed in Afghanistan. States have to 
meet strict criteria relating to governance, investing in people and economic freedom 
and anti-corruption indicators before they are permitted to design, for themselves, a 
MCA compact funding proposal. If they initially fail to meet these indicators they can 
apply for interim compact funding to help improve their scores. There are clear 
measures in place to get US objectives to stick. The MCA rewards initiative and 
strategies designed by recipients are more likely to be sustainable in the longer term. 
The US has also capitalized on the goodwill generated by The President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDs Relief (PEPFAR), initiated in 2002. ‘The American government is 
probably the world's largest supplier of condoms to Africa [and at] least 1m Africans 
get life-preserving antiretroviral drugs largely thanks to Uncle Sam’ (The Economist, 
2008). The US track record is not perfect, for instance MCA funds disbursement has 
suffered from bureaucratic problems and Bush risked alienating African publics by 
advocating abstinence as a cure for AIDS. Nevertheless African countries are largely 
favourable towards the US.         
 
Strategy, Trust and Opportunity 
 
Meanwhile the Philippines, the home of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the New 
People’s Army (NPA) and the focus of the ‘second front’ of the Global War on Terror 
in South East Asia scored an 85% favourability rating for the US. The Philippines 
ranked 10th for both recorded USAID obligations and for impact of terrorism in 2011. 
The Philippines was formerly a US colony and achieved peaceful independence in 
1946. The Philippines has been of enduring importance to the US as a gateway to the 
Pacific, maritime South East Asia and mainland East Asia. The strategic importance 
of the Philippines is set to continue as the Obama administration moves to consolidate 
its influence in East Asia via its ‘Asian Pivot’. The Philippines has the only deep-
water ports and airfields proximate to the South China Sea that are suitable for US 
needs.    
Contextual intelligence, either through accident or design, does seem to be in play in 
the Philippines. Since 1991 (with a suspension between 1995 and 1999) semi-regular 
joint military training ‘Balikatan’ (shoulder to shoulder) Exercises took place in the 
Philippines between US and Philippine forces. Whilst a vocal minority objects to 
these exercises as an incursion on Philippine sovereignty, Philippine trust ratings 
indicate that overall the US is welcome. The regular nature of the Balikatan Exercises 
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meant that post 9/11 the US was able to conduct counter-terror military operations in 
the Philippines under the guise of routine operations.        
Perhaps surprisingly approval ratings for the post 9/11 US troop presence was highest 
in Muslim Mindanao (The Sulu archipelago runs south-west from Mindanao. This 
area is the home of the ASG). Of the 90% of Mindanaoans aware of the exercises 
73% were in favour of them continuing (Pulse Asia, 2002). The popularity of troops 
was perhaps due to the military providing public services such as schools and roads 
with a degree of competency and accountability that exceeded that of the local and 
national government in the Philippines. Mindanao is ‘a highly destitute area compared 
with the rest of the Philippines and one in which it is generally accepted that Islamic 
communities have suffered the most’ (Cragin and Chalk, 2003, p. 16). Bush’s post 
9/11 counter-terrorism initiatives in the southern Philippines were ‘smart’ even before 
the term ‘smart power’ was mooted in policy circles. Here an effective synergy of soft 
and hard strategy was used to significantly reduce the operational capabilities of the 
ASG and seriously undermine its ideological appeal.  
In recent years the Philippines has been one of the largest recipients of US aid in East 
Asia and the Pacific. In 2013 the Philippines received $175, 571, 000, a figure far in 
excess of every other country in the region (Congressional Budget Justification, 2015, 
8). However, as Gallarotti observes, ‘the distinction between hard and soft power can 
be sometimes arbitrary and imperfect [aid…] may enhance a nation’s image, but this 
liquidity can be used to purchase donor exports or pay back debts to banks in donor 
nations’ (2015, p. 254). 2013 figures show that ‘two way goods traded between the 
US and the Philippines totaled $14.5 billion’ (Lum, 2015, p. 8). The external debt of 
the Philippines totaled $58.5 billion for 2013. 53.1% of this debt was denominated in 
US dollars (Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas, 2014). In other words a successful exercise 
in sticky power for the US. 
Meanwhile the Philippines plans to spend $1.7 billion over the next five years (2013-
2017) on ‘ships, helicopters and weapons’ (Lum, 2015, p. 10) with the ‘help’ of the 
US. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has a limited defence budget and this 
is reflected in its military arsenal. The Philippines has zero aircraft carriers, zero naval 
destroyers and zero submarines it also has zero fighter aircraft and zero attack 
helicopters (Global Firepower, 2015). Therefore it is not unreasonable to surmise that 
aid flowing out of US coffers is flowing back in again whilst also aligning the 
strategic objectives of the Philippines with those of the US.  
Cultural affinity, a more or less stable long-term relationship, economic 
interdependence and Chinese maritime ambitions in the South China Sea have 
successfully translated into high trust rating for the US in the Philippines. This means 
that when aid has been given it tends to be greeted positively rather than negatively. 
Thus smart power strategies have gained traction. However, overall the examples 
discussed above indicate that the US needs to develop a more consistent balance, or at 
least more cross referencing, between hard and soft power and it needs to develop 
comprehensive contextual intelligence. The statistics on trust indicate no amount of 
aid will make states adopt the values of the US if it advocates human rights and the 
rule of law whilst simultaneously undermining human rights, ignoring the rule of law, 
bombing civilians, and failing to halt the diversion of relief funds into the coffers of 
corrupt officials.  
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Conclusion 
 
Smart power is the idea that an actor can design a mix soft and hard power, or 
inducements and threats, as an integrated grand strategy that will encourage  ‘others’ 
to adopt designated values and align themselves with requisite policies. Smart power 
can relate to the foreign policy of states. Non-state actors, specifically terrorist 
networks, can also deploy strategies that mimic smart power. Smart power, like the 
war on terror, is a concept that involves both material resources and ideas. Therefore 
it has emerged as a US policy response to the Global War on Terror.  
Whilst US smart power draws on the sentiments of liberal internationalism this has 
been significantly undermined by a resort to armed conflict and power politics in 
frontline Islamic states, specifically Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. These states, 
along with Israel, top the list of recipients for US aid however they also top the list of 
states that trust the US the least. Whilst the international community may have had 
some degree of tolerance for the United Nations sanctioned war in Afghanistan the 
US driven war in Iraq reduced trust in the US even in states that were peripheral to the 
Global War on Terror. The US has sought to engage with Pakistan. However this 
relationship has been undermined for a number of reasons. Pakistanis think that the 
US has brought instability to the region and lacks due respect for its territorial 
integrity. The lack of trust is compounded by the ‘accidental’ deaths of Pakistanis 
during military operations including civilians. If we accept smart power as a strategy 
designed to counter the Global War on Terror then is seems to succeed least where it 
matters most. Smart power has tended to more effective in situations where the US 
enjoys relations that are stable and relatively good, such as the Philippines. Or where 
strategies are not dominated by uni-lateral US national security interests. The US 
needs to develop self-awareness of its appeal, or lack thereof, and contextual 
intelligence. Smart power strategies should be viewed from the stance of the audience 
not those who deploy it. It also needs to be reflexive. Smart power has no end point, 
just a constantly shifting dynamic. Potentially success can also only ever be measured 
in hindsight.   
Clinton’s component list of smart power: diplomacy, economics, military power, 
politics, legality, and culture are established tools of statecraft. By presenting smart 
power as something new the implication is made that these tools were not used in a 
‘smart’ fashion previously. The only new thing about smart power is the articulation 
that the balance between these tools needs refining. What actually needs to happen for 
soft and hard power to be smart is for these strategies to stick. The US needs to listen 
to the needs of its audience and cater for these needs. The aim should be to create an 
institutional and material dependency that, whilst sticky, is also viewed as benign. 
This could be achieved by targeting international aid at the issues that concern the 
target populations the most. This might include infrastructure and utilities, livelihood 
and education and health. The recipients of aid and loans should be required to submit 
and commit to a credible plan for the meaningful management of aid, such as that 
required by the MCA, and the future disbursement of aid should be conditional on 
humanitarian performance not alignment with the US.  The end result should however 
amount to the same thing. Infrastructure projects should be clearly branded e.g. 
USAID from the American People. The inference being that the American people 
care.      
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Smart power has emerged as a strategy in response to the multi-dimensional 
challenges of the Global War on Terror. The Global War on Terror is an extra-
territorial and asymmetric, material and ideological war. Soft power is of potential 
value if it can attract moderates to the aims and ideals of the US. However the US 
undermines its moderate appeal when it shores up despotic regimes, ignores the 
human rights and rule of law that it professes to champion and sanctions the torture 
and killing of civilians. The US has been unable to resist hard power and indeed this 
may be the only way to counter radical aims and objectives. However this is not 
sustainable and it is not smart. The US will not attract others to its values if it 
allocates vast amounts of foreign aid to unstable or weak states without checks and 
balances as outlined above. Foreign aid needs to be more soft and sticky and less hard 
and transient.   
The enduring nature of the Global War on Terror, the complexity of asymmetrical 
war fighting, difficulties in identifying the enemy or those susceptible to the allure of 
the enemy, knock on effects in terms of state implosion and human rights atrocities 
and the likelihood of a newly emerging Islamic diaspora mean that the need to ‘get 
smart’ is pressing. The US must devise effective strategies that counter the threat of 
terrorism otherwise it is in danger of frittering away foreign aid whilst also 
underwhelming the rest of the world with its lack of effective leadership. Smart 
strategy requires innovation and needs to be crafted as a relationship building exercise. 
For smart strategies to work they need to be orientated for the long-term.  This means 
that smart power generally and international aid specifically must be based on 
contextual intelligence that can better frame strategies that ‘stick’. If crafted well, 
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